Re-implement PKI from #1509 (#4379)

* Re-implement PKI from #1509
co-authored-by: edinnen <ethanjdinnen@protonmail.com>

* Set the key lengnth to actually make PKI work.

* Remove unused variable and initialize keys to null

* move printBytes() to meshUtils

* Don't reset PKI key son reboot unless needed.

* Remove double encryption for PKI messages

* Cleanup encrypt logic

* Add the MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI option, and set it for minimal builds. Required for STM32 targets for now.

* Use SHA-256 for PKI key hashing, and add MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI_KEYGEN for STM32

* Fix a crash when node is null

* Don't send PKI encrypted packets while licensed

* use chIndex 8 for PKI

* Don't be so clever, that you corrupt incoming packets

* Pass on channel 8 for now

* Typo

* Lock keys once non-zero

* We in fact need 2 scratch buffers, to store the encrypted bytes, unencrypted bytes, and decoded protobuf.

* Lighter approach to retaining known key

* Attach the public key to PKI decrypted packets in device memory

* Turn PKI back off for STM32 :(

* Don't just memcp over a protobuf

* Don't PKI encrypt nodeinfo packets

* Add a bit more memory logging around nodeDB

* Use the proper macro to refer to NODENUM_BROADCAST

* Typo fix

* Don't PKI encrypt ROUTING (naks and acks)

* Adds SecurityConfig protobuf

* Add admin messages over PKI

* Disable PKI for the WIO-e5

* Add MINIMUM_SAFE_FREE_HEAP macro and set to safe 1.5k

* Add missed "has_security"

* Add the admin_channel_enabled option

* STM32 again

* add missed configuration.h at the top of files

* Add EXCLUDE_TZ and RTC

* Enable PKI build on STM32 once again

* Attempt 1 at moving PKI to aes-ccm

* Fix buffers for encrypt/decrypt

* Eliminate unused aes variable

* Add debugging lines

* Set hash to 0 for PKI

* Fix debug lines so they don't print pointers.

* logic fix and more debug

* Rather important typo

* Check for short packets before attempting decrypt

* Don't forget to give cryptoEngine the keys!

* Use the right scratch buffer

* Cleanup

* moar cleanups

* Minor hardening

* Remove some in-progress stuff

* Turn PKI back off on STM32

* Return false

* 2.5 protos

* Sync up protos

* Add initial cryptography test vector tests

* re-add MINIMUM_SAFE_FREE_HEAP

* Housekeeping and comment fixes

* Add explanatory comment about weak dh25519 keys

---------

Co-authored-by: Ben Meadors <benmmeadors@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
Jonathan Bennett
2024-08-10 13:45:41 -05:00
parent c451db3a3f
commit b726792efd
19 changed files with 641 additions and 79 deletions

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@@ -1,6 +1,176 @@
#include "CryptoEngine.h"
#include "NodeDB.h"
#include "RadioInterface.h"
#include "configuration.h"
#if !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI)
#include "aes-ccm.h"
#include "meshUtils.h"
#include <Crypto.h>
#include <Curve25519.h>
#include <SHA256.h>
#if !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI_KEYGEN)
/**
* Create a public/private key pair with Curve25519.
*
* @param pubKey The destination for the public key.
* @param privKey The destination for the private key.
*/
void CryptoEngine::generateKeyPair(uint8_t *pubKey, uint8_t *privKey)
{
LOG_DEBUG("Generating Curve25519 key pair...\n");
Curve25519::dh1(public_key, private_key);
memcpy(pubKey, public_key, sizeof(public_key));
memcpy(privKey, private_key, sizeof(private_key));
}
#endif
uint8_t shared_key[32];
void CryptoEngine::clearKeys()
{
memset(public_key, 0, sizeof(public_key));
memset(private_key, 0, sizeof(private_key));
}
/**
* Encrypt a packet's payload using a key generated with Curve25519 and SHA256
* for a specific node.
*
* @param bytes is updated in place
*/
bool CryptoEngine::encryptCurve25519(uint32_t toNode, uint32_t fromNode, uint64_t packetNum, size_t numBytes, uint8_t *bytes,
uint8_t *bytesOut)
{
uint8_t *auth;
auth = bytesOut + numBytes;
meshtastic_NodeInfoLite *node = nodeDB->getMeshNode(toNode);
if (node->num < 1 || node->user.public_key.size == 0) {
LOG_DEBUG("Node %d or their public_key not found\n", toNode);
return false;
}
if (!crypto->setDHKey(toNode)) {
return false;
}
initNonce(fromNode, packetNum);
// Calculate the shared secret with the destination node and encrypt
printBytes("Attempting encrypt using nonce: ", nonce, 16);
printBytes("Attempting encrypt using shared_key: ", shared_key, 32);
aes_ccm_ae(shared_key, 32, nonce, 8, bytes, numBytes, nullptr, 0, bytesOut, auth);
return true;
}
/**
* Decrypt a packet's payload using a key generated with Curve25519 and SHA256
* for a specific node.
*
* @param bytes is updated in place
*/
bool CryptoEngine::decryptCurve25519(uint32_t fromNode, uint64_t packetNum, size_t numBytes, uint8_t *bytes, uint8_t *bytesOut)
{
uint8_t *auth; // set to last 8 bytes of text?
auth = bytes + numBytes - 8;
meshtastic_NodeInfoLite *node = nodeDB->getMeshNode(fromNode);
if (node == nullptr || node->num < 1 || node->user.public_key.size == 0) {
LOG_DEBUG("Node or its public key not found in database\n");
return false;
}
// Calculate the shared secret with the sending node and decrypt
if (!crypto->setDHKey(fromNode)) {
return false;
}
initNonce(fromNode, packetNum);
printBytes("Attempting decrypt using nonce: ", nonce, 16);
printBytes("Attempting decrypt using shared_key: ", shared_key, 32);
return aes_ccm_ad(shared_key, 32, nonce, 8, bytes, numBytes - 8, nullptr, 0, auth, bytesOut);
}
void CryptoEngine::setPrivateKey(uint8_t *_private_key)
{
memcpy(private_key, _private_key, 32);
}
/**
* Set the PKI key used for encrypt, decrypt.
*
* @param nodeNum the node number of the node who's public key we want to use
*/
bool CryptoEngine::setDHKey(uint32_t nodeNum)
{
meshtastic_NodeInfoLite *node = nodeDB->getMeshNode(nodeNum);
if (node->num < 1 || node->user.public_key.size == 0) {
LOG_DEBUG("Node %d or their public_key not found\n", nodeNum);
return false;
}
uint8_t *pubKey = node->user.public_key.bytes;
uint8_t local_priv[32];
memcpy(shared_key, pubKey, 32);
memcpy(local_priv, private_key, 32);
// Calculate the shared secret with the specified node's public key and our private key
// This includes an internal weak key check, which among other things looks for an all 0 public key and shared key.
if (!Curve25519::dh2(shared_key, local_priv)) {
LOG_WARN("Curve25519DH step 2 failed!\n");
return false;
}
printBytes("DH Output: ", shared_key, 32);
/**
* D.J. Bernstein reccomends hashing the shared key. We want to do this because there are
* at least 128 bits of entropy in the 256-bit output of the DH key exchange, but we don't
* really know where. If you extract, for instance, the first 128 bits with basic truncation,
* then you don't know if you got all of your 128 entropy bits, or less, possibly much less.
*
* No exploitable bias is really known at that point, but we know enough to be wary.
* Hashing the DH output is a simple and safe way to gather all the entropy and spread
* it around as needed.
*/
crypto->hash(shared_key, 32);
return true;
}
/**
* Hash arbitrary data using SHA256.
*
* @param bytes
* @param numBytes
*/
void CryptoEngine::hash(uint8_t *bytes, size_t numBytes)
{
SHA256 hash;
size_t posn, len;
uint8_t size = numBytes;
uint8_t inc = 16;
hash.reset();
for (posn = 0; posn < size; posn += inc) {
len = size - posn;
if (len > inc)
len = inc;
hash.update(bytes + posn, len);
}
hash.finalize(bytes, 32);
}
void CryptoEngine::aesSetKey(const uint8_t *key_bytes, size_t key_len)
{
if (aes) {
delete aes;
aes = nullptr;
}
if (key_len != 0) {
aes = new AESSmall256();
aes->setKey(key_bytes, key_len);
}
}
void CryptoEngine::aesEncrypt(uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out)
{
aes->encryptBlock(out, in);
}
#endif
concurrency::Lock *cryptLock;
void CryptoEngine::setKey(const CryptoKey &k)

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@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
#pragma once
#include "AES.h"
#include "concurrency/LockGuard.h"
#include "configuration.h"
#include "mesh-pb-constants.h"
#include <Arduino.h>
extern concurrency::Lock *cryptLock;
@@ -26,9 +28,34 @@ class CryptoEngine
uint8_t nonce[16] = {0};
CryptoKey key = {};
#if !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI)
uint8_t private_key[32] = {0};
#endif
public:
#if !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI)
uint8_t public_key[32] = {0};
#endif
virtual ~CryptoEngine() {}
#if !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI)
#if !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI_KEYGEN)
virtual void generateKeyPair(uint8_t *pubKey, uint8_t *privKey);
#endif
void clearKeys();
void setPrivateKey(uint8_t *_private_key);
virtual bool encryptCurve25519(uint32_t toNode, uint32_t fromNode, uint64_t packetNum, size_t numBytes, uint8_t *bytes,
uint8_t *bytesOut);
virtual bool decryptCurve25519(uint32_t fromNode, uint64_t packetNum, size_t numBytes, uint8_t *bytes, uint8_t *bytesOut);
virtual bool setDHKey(uint32_t nodeNum);
virtual void hash(uint8_t *bytes, size_t numBytes);
virtual void aesSetKey(const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len);
virtual void aesEncrypt(uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out);
AESSmall256 *aes = NULL;
#endif
/**
* Set the key used for encrypt, decrypt.
@@ -61,4 +88,4 @@ class CryptoEngine
void initNonce(uint32_t fromNode, uint64_t packetId);
};
extern CryptoEngine *crypto;
extern CryptoEngine *crypto;

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@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
#include "error.h"
#include "main.h"
#include "mesh-pb-constants.h"
#include "meshUtils.h"
#include "modules/NeighborInfoModule.h"
#include <ErriezCRC32.h>
#include <algorithm>
@@ -123,6 +124,31 @@ NodeDB::NodeDB()
// Include our owner in the node db under our nodenum
meshtastic_NodeInfoLite *info = getOrCreateMeshNode(getNodeNum());
#if !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI)
// Calculate Curve25519 public and private keys
printBytes("Old Pubkey", config.security.public_key.bytes, 32);
if (config.security.private_key.size == 32 && config.security.public_key.size == 32) {
LOG_INFO("Using saved PKI keys\n");
owner.public_key.size = config.security.public_key.size;
memcpy(owner.public_key.bytes, config.security.public_key.bytes, config.security.public_key.size);
crypto->setPrivateKey(config.security.private_key.bytes);
} else {
#if !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI_KEYGEN)
LOG_INFO("Generating new PKI keys\n");
crypto->generateKeyPair(config.security.public_key.bytes, config.security.private_key.bytes);
config.security.public_key.size = 32;
config.security.private_key.size = 32;
printBytes("New Pubkey", config.security.public_key.bytes, 32);
owner.public_key.size = 32;
memcpy(owner.public_key.bytes, config.security.public_key.bytes, 32);
#else
LOG_INFO("No PKI keys set, and generation disabled!\n");
#endif
}
#endif
info->user = owner;
info->has_user = true;
@@ -237,6 +263,7 @@ void NodeDB::installDefaultConfig()
config.has_power = true;
config.has_network = true;
config.has_bluetooth = (HAS_BLUETOOTH ? true : false);
config.has_security = true;
config.device.rebroadcast_mode = meshtastic_Config_DeviceConfig_RebroadcastMode_ALL;
config.lora.sx126x_rx_boosted_gain = true;
@@ -259,6 +286,14 @@ void NodeDB::installDefaultConfig()
#else
config.lora.ignore_mqtt = false;
#endif
#ifdef ADMIN_KEY_USERPREFS
memcpy(config.security.admin_key.bytes, admin_key_userprefs, 32);
config.security.admin_key.size = 32;
#else
config.security.admin_key.size = 0;
#endif
config.security.public_key.size = 0;
config.security.private_key.size = 0;
#ifdef PIN_GPS_EN
config.position.gps_en_gpio = PIN_GPS_EN;
#endif
@@ -282,7 +317,8 @@ void NodeDB::installDefaultConfig()
config.position.broadcast_smart_minimum_interval_secs = 30;
if (config.device.role != meshtastic_Config_DeviceConfig_Role_ROUTER)
config.device.node_info_broadcast_secs = default_node_info_broadcast_secs;
config.device.serial_enabled = true;
config.security.serial_enabled = true;
config.security.admin_channel_enabled = false;
resetRadioConfig();
strncpy(config.network.ntp_server, "meshtastic.pool.ntp.org", 32);
// FIXME: Default to bluetooth capability of platform as default
@@ -778,6 +814,7 @@ bool NodeDB::saveToDiskNoRetry(int saveWhat)
config.has_power = true;
config.has_network = true;
config.has_bluetooth = true;
config.has_security = true;
success &= saveProto(configFileName, meshtastic_LocalConfig_size, &meshtastic_LocalConfig_msg, &config);
}
@@ -957,7 +994,7 @@ void NodeDB::updateTelemetry(uint32_t nodeId, const meshtastic_Telemetry &t, RxS
/** Update user info and channel for this node based on received user data
*/
bool NodeDB::updateUser(uint32_t nodeId, const meshtastic_User &p, uint8_t channelIndex)
bool NodeDB::updateUser(uint32_t nodeId, meshtastic_User &p, uint8_t channelIndex)
{
meshtastic_NodeInfoLite *info = getOrCreateMeshNode(nodeId);
if (!info) {
@@ -965,6 +1002,12 @@ bool NodeDB::updateUser(uint32_t nodeId, const meshtastic_User &p, uint8_t chann
}
LOG_DEBUG("old user %s/%s/%s, channel=%d\n", info->user.id, info->user.long_name, info->user.short_name, info->channel);
#if !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI)
if (info->user.public_key.size > 0) { // if we have a key for this user already, don't overwrite with a new one
printBytes("Retaining Old Pubkey: ", info->user.public_key.bytes, 32);
memcpy(p.public_key.bytes, info->user.public_key.bytes, 32);
}
#endif
// Both of info->user and p start as filled with zero so I think this is okay
bool changed = memcmp(&info->user, &p, sizeof(info->user)) || (info->channel != channelIndex);
@@ -1042,7 +1085,7 @@ meshtastic_NodeInfoLite *NodeDB::getOrCreateMeshNode(NodeNum n)
meshtastic_NodeInfoLite *lite = getMeshNode(n);
if (!lite) {
if ((numMeshNodes >= MAX_NUM_NODES) || (memGet.getFreeHeap() < meshtastic_NodeInfoLite_size * 3)) {
if ((numMeshNodes >= MAX_NUM_NODES) || (memGet.getFreeHeap() < MINIMUM_SAFE_FREE_HEAP)) {
if (screen)
screen->print("Warn: node database full!\nErasing oldest entry\n");
LOG_WARN("Node database full with %i nodes and %i bytes free! Erasing oldest entry\n", numMeshNodes,
@@ -1068,6 +1111,7 @@ meshtastic_NodeInfoLite *NodeDB::getOrCreateMeshNode(NodeNum n)
// everything is missing except the nodenum
memset(lite, 0, sizeof(*lite));
lite->num = n;
LOG_INFO("Adding node to database with %i nodes and %i bytes free!\n", numMeshNodes, memGet.getFreeHeap());
}
return lite;

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@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ class NodeDB
/** Update user info and channel for this node based on received user data
*/
bool updateUser(uint32_t nodeId, const meshtastic_User &p, uint8_t channelIndex = 0);
bool updateUser(uint32_t nodeId, meshtastic_User &p, uint8_t channelIndex = 0);
/// @return our node number
NodeNum getNodeNum() { return myNodeInfo.my_node_num; }

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@@ -255,6 +255,10 @@ size_t PhoneAPI::getFromRadio(uint8_t *buf)
fromRadioScratch.config.which_payload_variant = meshtastic_Config_bluetooth_tag;
fromRadioScratch.config.payload_variant.bluetooth = config.bluetooth;
break;
case meshtastic_Config_security_tag:
fromRadioScratch.config.which_payload_variant = meshtastic_Config_security_tag;
fromRadioScratch.config.payload_variant.security = config.security;
break;
default:
LOG_ERROR("Unknown config type %d\n", config_state);
}

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@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ static MemoryDynamic<meshtastic_MeshPacket> staticPool;
Allocator<meshtastic_MeshPacket> &packetPool = staticPool;
static uint8_t bytes[MAX_RHPACKETLEN];
static uint8_t ScratchEncrypted[MAX_RHPACKETLEN];
/**
* Constructor
@@ -307,70 +308,105 @@ bool perhapsDecode(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p)
if (p->which_payload_variant == meshtastic_MeshPacket_decoded_tag)
return true; // If packet was already decoded just return
// assert(p->which_payloadVariant == MeshPacket_encrypted_tag);
size_t rawSize = p->encrypted.size;
if (rawSize > sizeof(bytes)) {
LOG_ERROR("Packet too large to attempt decryption! (rawSize=%d > 256)\n", rawSize);
return false;
}
bool decrypted = false;
ChannelIndex chIndex = 0;
memcpy(bytes, p->encrypted.bytes,
rawSize); // we have to copy into a scratch buffer, because these bytes are a union with the decoded protobuf
memcpy(ScratchEncrypted, p->encrypted.bytes, rawSize);
#if !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI)
// Attempt PKI decryption first
if (p->channel == 0 && p->to == nodeDB->getNodeNum() && p->to > 0 && nodeDB->getMeshNode(p->from) != nullptr &&
nodeDB->getMeshNode(p->from)->user.public_key.size > 0 && nodeDB->getMeshNode(p->to)->user.public_key.size > 0 &&
rawSize > 8) {
LOG_DEBUG("Attempting PKI decryption\n");
// Try to find a channel that works with this hash
for (ChannelIndex chIndex = 0; chIndex < channels.getNumChannels(); chIndex++) {
// Try to use this hash/channel pair
if (channels.decryptForHash(chIndex, p->channel)) {
// Try to decrypt the packet if we can
size_t rawSize = p->encrypted.size;
if (rawSize > sizeof(bytes)) {
LOG_ERROR("Packet too large to attempt decription! (rawSize=%d > 256)\n", rawSize);
return false;
}
memcpy(bytes, p->encrypted.bytes,
rawSize); // we have to copy into a scratch buffer, because these bytes are a union with the decoded protobuf
crypto->decrypt(p->from, p->id, rawSize, bytes);
// printBytes("plaintext", bytes, p->encrypted.size);
// Take those raw bytes and convert them back into a well structured protobuf we can understand
if (crypto->decryptCurve25519(p->from, p->id, rawSize, ScratchEncrypted, bytes)) {
LOG_INFO("PKI Decryption worked!\n");
memset(&p->decoded, 0, sizeof(p->decoded));
if (!pb_decode_from_bytes(bytes, rawSize, &meshtastic_Data_msg, &p->decoded)) {
LOG_ERROR("Invalid protobufs in received mesh packet (bad psk?)!\n");
} else if (p->decoded.portnum == meshtastic_PortNum_UNKNOWN_APP) {
LOG_ERROR("Invalid portnum (bad psk?)!\n");
rawSize -= 8;
if (pb_decode_from_bytes(bytes, rawSize, &meshtastic_Data_msg, &p->decoded) &&
p->decoded.portnum != meshtastic_PortNum_UNKNOWN_APP) {
decrypted = true;
LOG_INFO("Packet decrypted using PKI!\n");
p->pki_encrypted = true;
memcpy(&p->public_key.bytes, nodeDB->getMeshNode(p->from)->user.public_key.bytes, 32);
p->public_key.size = 32;
// memcpy(bytes, ScratchEncrypted, rawSize); // TODO: Rename the bytes buffers
// chIndex = 8;
} else {
// parsing was successful
p->which_payload_variant = meshtastic_MeshPacket_decoded_tag; // change type to decoded
p->channel = chIndex; // change to store the index instead of the hash
/* Not actually ever used.
// Decompress if needed. jm
if (p->decoded.portnum == meshtastic_PortNum_TEXT_MESSAGE_COMPRESSED_APP) {
// Decompress the payload
char compressed_in[meshtastic_Constants_DATA_PAYLOAD_LEN] = {};
char decompressed_out[meshtastic_Constants_DATA_PAYLOAD_LEN] = {};
int decompressed_len;
memcpy(compressed_in, p->decoded.payload.bytes, p->decoded.payload.size);
decompressed_len = unishox2_decompress_simple(compressed_in, p->decoded.payload.size, decompressed_out);
// LOG_DEBUG("\n\n**\n\nDecompressed length - %d \n", decompressed_len);
memcpy(p->decoded.payload.bytes, decompressed_out, decompressed_len);
// Switch the port from PortNum_TEXT_MESSAGE_COMPRESSED_APP to PortNum_TEXT_MESSAGE_APP
p->decoded.portnum = meshtastic_PortNum_TEXT_MESSAGE_APP;
} */
printPacket("decoded message", p);
#if ENABLE_JSON_LOGGING
LOG_TRACE("%s\n", MeshPacketSerializer::JsonSerialize(p, false).c_str());
#elif ARCH_PORTDUINO
if (settingsStrings[traceFilename] != "" || settingsMap[logoutputlevel] == level_trace) {
LOG_TRACE("%s\n", MeshPacketSerializer::JsonSerialize(p, false).c_str());
}
#endif
return true;
return false;
}
}
}
#endif
LOG_WARN("No suitable channel found for decoding, hash was 0x%x!\n", p->channel);
return false;
// assert(p->which_payloadVariant == MeshPacket_encrypted_tag);
if (!decrypted) {
// Try to find a channel that works with this hash
for (chIndex = 0; chIndex < channels.getNumChannels(); chIndex++) {
// Try to use this hash/channel pair
if (channels.decryptForHash(chIndex, p->channel)) {
// Try to decrypt the packet if we can
crypto->decrypt(p->from, p->id, rawSize, bytes);
// printBytes("plaintext", bytes, p->encrypted.size);
// Take those raw bytes and convert them back into a well structured protobuf we can understand
memset(&p->decoded, 0, sizeof(p->decoded));
if (!pb_decode_from_bytes(bytes, rawSize, &meshtastic_Data_msg, &p->decoded)) {
LOG_ERROR("Invalid protobufs in received mesh packet id=0x%08x (bad psk?)!\n", p->id);
} else if (p->decoded.portnum == meshtastic_PortNum_UNKNOWN_APP) {
LOG_ERROR("Invalid portnum (bad psk?)!\n");
} else {
decrypted = true;
break;
}
}
}
}
if (decrypted) {
// parsing was successful
p->which_payload_variant = meshtastic_MeshPacket_decoded_tag; // change type to decoded
p->channel = chIndex; // change to store the index instead of the hash
/* Not actually ever used.
// Decompress if needed. jm
if (p->decoded.portnum == meshtastic_PortNum_TEXT_MESSAGE_COMPRESSED_APP) {
// Decompress the payload
char compressed_in[meshtastic_Constants_DATA_PAYLOAD_LEN] = {};
char decompressed_out[meshtastic_Constants_DATA_PAYLOAD_LEN] = {};
int decompressed_len;
memcpy(compressed_in, p->decoded.payload.bytes, p->decoded.payload.size);
decompressed_len = unishox2_decompress_simple(compressed_in, p->decoded.payload.size, decompressed_out);
// LOG_DEBUG("\n\n**\n\nDecompressed length - %d \n", decompressed_len);
memcpy(p->decoded.payload.bytes, decompressed_out, decompressed_len);
// Switch the port from PortNum_TEXT_MESSAGE_COMPRESSED_APP to PortNum_TEXT_MESSAGE_APP
p->decoded.portnum = meshtastic_PortNum_TEXT_MESSAGE_APP;
} */
printPacket("decoded message", p);
#if ENABLE_JSON_LOGGING
LOG_TRACE("%s\n", MeshPacketSerializer::JsonSerialize(p, false).c_str());
#elif ARCH_PORTDUINO
if (settingsStrings[traceFilename] != "" || settingsMap[logoutputlevel] == level_trace) {
LOG_TRACE("%s\n", MeshPacketSerializer::JsonSerialize(p, false).c_str());
}
#endif
return true;
} else {
LOG_WARN("No suitable channel found for decoding, hash was 0x%x!\n", p->channel);
return false;
}
}
/** Return 0 for success or a Routing_Errror code for failure
@@ -384,7 +420,6 @@ meshtastic_Routing_Error perhapsEncode(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p)
size_t numbytes = pb_encode_to_bytes(bytes, sizeof(bytes), &meshtastic_Data_msg, &p->decoded);
/* Not actually used, so save the cycles
// Only allow encryption on the text message app.
// TODO: Allow modules to opt into compression.
if (p->decoded.portnum == meshtastic_PortNum_TEXT_MESSAGE_APP) {
@@ -432,10 +467,28 @@ meshtastic_Routing_Error perhapsEncode(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p)
// Now that we are encrypting the packet channel should be the hash (no longer the index)
p->channel = hash;
#if !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI)
meshtastic_NodeInfoLite *node = nodeDB->getMeshNode(p->to);
if (!owner.is_licensed && p->to != NODENUM_BROADCAST && node != nullptr && node->user.public_key.size > 0 &&
p->decoded.portnum != meshtastic_PortNum_TRACEROUTE_APP && p->decoded.portnum != meshtastic_PortNum_NODEINFO_APP &&
p->decoded.portnum != meshtastic_PortNum_ROUTING_APP) { // TODO: check for size due to 8 byte tag
LOG_DEBUG("Using PKI!\n");
if (numbytes + 8 > MAX_RHPACKETLEN)
return meshtastic_Routing_Error_TOO_LARGE;
crypto->encryptCurve25519(p->to, getFrom(p), p->id, numbytes, bytes, ScratchEncrypted);
numbytes += 8;
memcpy(p->encrypted.bytes, ScratchEncrypted, numbytes);
p->channel = 0;
} else {
crypto->encrypt(getFrom(p), p->id, numbytes, bytes);
memcpy(p->encrypted.bytes, bytes, numbytes);
}
#else
crypto->encrypt(getFrom(p), p->id, numbytes, bytes);
memcpy(p->encrypted.bytes, bytes, numbytes);
#endif
// Copy back into the packet and set the variant type
memcpy(p->encrypted.bytes, bytes, numbytes);
p->encrypted.size = numbytes;
p->which_payload_variant = meshtastic_MeshPacket_encrypted_tag;
}
@@ -539,4 +592,4 @@ void Router::perhapsHandleReceived(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p)
handleReceived(p);
packetPool.release(p);
}
}

157
src/mesh/aes-ccm.cpp Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
/*
* Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM) with AES
*
* Copyright (c) 2010-2012, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
*
* This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
* See README for more details.
*/
#define AES_BLOCK_SIZE 16
#include "aes-ccm.h"
#if !MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI
static inline void WPA_PUT_BE16(uint8_t *a, uint16_t val)
{
a[0] = val >> 8;
a[1] = val & 0xff;
}
static void xor_aes_block(uint8_t *dst, const uint8_t *src)
{
uint32_t *d = (uint32_t *)dst;
uint32_t *s = (uint32_t *)src;
*d++ ^= *s++;
*d++ ^= *s++;
*d++ ^= *s++;
*d++ ^= *s++;
}
static void aes_ccm_auth_start(size_t M, size_t L, const uint8_t *nonce, const uint8_t *aad, size_t aad_len, size_t plain_len,
uint8_t *x)
{
uint8_t aad_buf[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
uint8_t b[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
/* Authentication */
/* B_0: Flags | Nonce N | l(m) */
b[0] = aad_len ? 0x40 : 0 /* Adata */;
b[0] |= (((M - 2) / 2) /* M' */ << 3);
b[0] |= (L - 1) /* L' */;
memcpy(&b[1], nonce, 15 - L);
WPA_PUT_BE16(&b[AES_BLOCK_SIZE - L], plain_len);
crypto->aesEncrypt(b, x); /* X_1 = E(K, B_0) */
if (!aad_len)
return;
WPA_PUT_BE16(aad_buf, aad_len);
memcpy(aad_buf + 2, aad, aad_len);
memset(aad_buf + 2 + aad_len, 0, sizeof(aad_buf) - 2 - aad_len);
xor_aes_block(aad_buf, x);
crypto->aesEncrypt(aad_buf, x); /* X_2 = E(K, X_1 XOR B_1) */
if (aad_len > AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 2) {
xor_aes_block(&aad_buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE], x);
/* X_3 = E(K, X_2 XOR B_2) */
crypto->aesEncrypt(&aad_buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE], x);
}
}
static void aes_ccm_auth(const uint8_t *data, size_t len, uint8_t *x)
{
size_t last = len % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < len / AES_BLOCK_SIZE; i++) {
/* X_i+1 = E(K, X_i XOR B_i) */
xor_aes_block(x, data);
data += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
crypto->aesEncrypt(x, x);
}
if (last) {
/* XOR zero-padded last block */
for (i = 0; i < last; i++)
x[i] ^= *data++;
crypto->aesEncrypt(x, x);
}
}
static void aes_ccm_encr_start(size_t L, const uint8_t *nonce, uint8_t *a)
{
/* A_i = Flags | Nonce N | Counter i */
a[0] = L - 1; /* Flags = L' */
memcpy(&a[1], nonce, 15 - L);
}
static void aes_ccm_encr(size_t L, const uint8_t *in, size_t len, uint8_t *out, uint8_t *a)
{
size_t last = len % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
size_t i;
/* crypt = msg XOR (S_1 | S_2 | ... | S_n) */
for (i = 1; i <= len / AES_BLOCK_SIZE; i++) {
WPA_PUT_BE16(&a[AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 2], i);
/* S_i = E(K, A_i) */
crypto->aesEncrypt(a, out);
xor_aes_block(out, in);
out += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
in += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
}
if (last) {
WPA_PUT_BE16(&a[AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 2], i);
crypto->aesEncrypt(a, out);
/* XOR zero-padded last block */
for (i = 0; i < last; i++)
*out++ ^= *in++;
}
}
static void aes_ccm_encr_auth(size_t M, uint8_t *x, uint8_t *a, uint8_t *auth)
{
size_t i;
uint8_t tmp[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
/* U = T XOR S_0; S_0 = E(K, A_0) */
WPA_PUT_BE16(&a[AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 2], 0);
crypto->aesEncrypt(a, tmp);
for (i = 0; i < M; i++)
auth[i] = x[i] ^ tmp[i];
}
static void aes_ccm_decr_auth(size_t M, uint8_t *a, const uint8_t *auth, uint8_t *t)
{
size_t i;
uint8_t tmp[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
/* U = T XOR S_0; S_0 = E(K, A_0) */
WPA_PUT_BE16(&a[AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 2], 0);
crypto->aesEncrypt(a, tmp);
for (i = 0; i < M; i++)
t[i] = auth[i] ^ tmp[i];
}
/* AES-CCM with fixed L=2 and aad_len <= 30 assumption */
int aes_ccm_ae(const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len, const uint8_t *nonce, size_t M, const uint8_t *plain, size_t plain_len,
const uint8_t *aad, size_t aad_len, uint8_t *crypt, uint8_t *auth)
{
const size_t L = 2;
uint8_t x[AES_BLOCK_SIZE], a[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
if (aad_len > 30 || M > AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
return -1;
crypto->aesSetKey(key, key_len);
aes_ccm_auth_start(M, L, nonce, aad, aad_len, plain_len, x);
aes_ccm_auth(plain, plain_len, x);
/* Encryption */
aes_ccm_encr_start(L, nonce, a);
aes_ccm_encr(L, plain, plain_len, crypt, a);
aes_ccm_encr_auth(M, x, a, auth);
return 0;
}
/* AES-CCM with fixed L=2 and aad_len <= 30 assumption */
bool aes_ccm_ad(const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len, const uint8_t *nonce, size_t M, const uint8_t *crypt, size_t crypt_len,
const uint8_t *aad, size_t aad_len, const uint8_t *auth, uint8_t *plain)
{
const size_t L = 2;
uint8_t x[AES_BLOCK_SIZE], a[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
uint8_t t[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
if (aad_len > 30 || M > AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
return false;
crypto->aesSetKey(key, key_len);
/* Decryption */
aes_ccm_encr_start(L, nonce, a);
aes_ccm_decr_auth(M, a, auth, t);
/* plaintext = msg XOR (S_1 | S_2 | ... | S_n) */
aes_ccm_encr(L, crypt, crypt_len, plain, a);
aes_ccm_auth_start(M, L, nonce, aad, aad_len, crypt_len, x);
aes_ccm_auth(plain, crypt_len, x);
if (memcmp(x, t, M) != 0) { // FIXME make const comp
return false;
}
return true;
}
#endif

10
src/mesh/aes-ccm.h Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
#pragma once
#include "CryptoEngine.h"
#if !MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI
int aes_ccm_ae(const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len, const uint8_t *nonce, size_t M, const uint8_t *plain, size_t plain_len,
const uint8_t *aad, size_t aad_len, uint8_t *crypt, uint8_t *auth);
bool aes_ccm_ad(const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len, const uint8_t *nonce, size_t M, const uint8_t *crypt, size_t crypt_len,
const uint8_t *aad, size_t aad_len, const uint8_t *auth, uint8_t *plain);
#endif